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Abstract
This paper describes a computer simulation game being developed to teach computer security
principles.  The player of the game constructs computer networks and makes choices affecting
the ability of these networks and the game’s virtual users to protect valuable assets from attack
by both vandals and well-motivated professionals.  The game introduces the player to the need
for well formed information security policies, allowing the player to deploy a variety of means to
enforce security policies, including authentication, audit and access controls.   The game will de-
pict a number of vulnerabilities ranging from trivial passwords to trap doors planted by highly
skilled, well-funded adversaries.
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Introduction
The last several years have seen a tremendous increase in awareness of computer security threats
and countermeasures.   Ten years ago, if a mainstream periodical ran an article that mentioned
computer vulnerabilities the novelty of making the news would create a stir in the computer se-
curity community.  Today, grandmothers wonder if computer viruses are the source of their
problems with “Web TV”.  Despite this increased awareness, users continue to select trivial
passwords and network administrators routinely deploy systems without configuring them to re-
duce the risks of their being hijacked by children as platforms for engaging in vandalism against
other systems.  Further still, corporate and government policy makers often elect to deploy weak
protection mechanisms in environments subject to potentially highly motivated hostile attacks.
For example, the US General Accounting Office has again issued a failing grade to the security
of most US Government computer systems (GAO, 2002).  The increased awareness of computer
security does not appear to translate into significant changes in behavior.   The assumption in the
work described in this paper is that much of the increased awareness of computer security is in
the realm of hype and myth while in the real world most people don’t give a second thought to
less newsworthy yet consequential concerns.  Examples of the latter are trivial password choices
(CEO’s and government leaders are notorious for these) and management decisions to connect
critical networks to potentially hostile networks without a sound technical basis for trusting the
associated protection mechanisms.
Education and training in computer security is often mundane and boring for both users and ad-
ministrators.    And some of the more critical conceptual issues are subtle, often eluding policy
makers whose perceptions have been shaped by sensationalized accounts of “good hackers” and
“bad hackers” engaged in a perpetual game of cat and mouse.  A considerable amount of useful
information has been published about the fundamental concepts of computer security (Brinkley,
1995; Pfleeger, 2003; Summers, 1997; Bishop, 2003), however sometimes people have to expe-
rience a problem in order to understand it.  In addition, like many forms of engineering and
medicine, the practice of computer security requires knowledge of the requisite facts as well as a
tacit understanding of the art of security engineering.  Computer security training and education
can greatly benefit from an engaging means of presenting material that can potentially alter be-
havior of a broad audience including typical users and policy makers.
The remainder of this paper describes work to construct a commercial-quality game for teaching
computer security concepts. The next section provides additional background regarding the edu-
cational program at the Naval Postgraduate School and motivation for the game. This is followed
by a description of the elements of the game’s underlying simulation and the way it will be
played. We then discuss the information assurance concepts to be conveyed by the game. The
worldviews and strategies applied in the game are presented followed by a summary.
A Game to Illustrate the Effects of Security Choices
The Center for the Information Systems Studies and Research (CISR) at the Naval Postgraduate
School has established a broad program in computer and network security education (Irvine,
1997; Irvine 2001). The program is founded on a core in traditional computer science that is ex-
tended by a progression of specialized courses and a broad set of research projects in information
assurance. An objective of CISR has been improvement of information assurance education and
training for the U.S. military and government.
Better materials are needed to convey the general concepts of computer and network security to a
broad audience unaware of the routine measures that could be taken to improve the protection of
sensitive and critical information.  In addition, the combined tension between the need for con-
tinued higher education combined with a widely distributed work force presents challenges in the
delivery of pedagogical material. CISR has sought ways to extend its educational program be-
yond the physical boundaries of the campus.
Training and education in information assurance can take many forms. A challenge is to create a
tool that not only conveys information, but also teaches users how to apply that information in a
variety of situations. Several choices are available:
• A homogeneously trained pool of computer network security personnel can be created.
Unfortunately, this uniform target will make the adversary's job easier, since personnel
would provide merely rote responses and can be expected to react similarly to an attack
and to apply lowest-common-denominator security engineering techniques to system de-
sign and implementation.
• It can provide distributed management of educational content, depending upon local or-
ganizations to provide training. This will provide heterogeneity, however, there is a dan-
ger that some localities may be very weak.
• It can provide a set of uniform training on tools and techniques, and simultaneously build
a cadre of personnel who understand what they are doing and have the background and
concepts needed to adapt to changing conditions and apply internalized concepts to new
architectures. This third approach has the salubrious effect of making systems more diffi-
cult targets to attack.
The third approach has been chosen and, as part of that effort, we are building a computer game
based on computer security concepts. This strategy for enhancing CISR’s ability to provide com-
puter and network security education exploits an established market and the growing acceptance
of computer games in education (Kirriemuir, 2002).  The game will simulate a range of scenarios
involving computer networks.  An example scenario is a business enterprise (e.g., a pharmaceu-
tical company) that possesses highly valuable assets within a computer network.  In such a sce-
nario, employees of the enterprise require on-line access to a variety of assets having different
values, yet the assets must be protected from compromise.  The game lies in the tension created
by the competing goals of efficient and affordable access to assets and protection of assets from
unauthorized disclosure or modification.
The security simulation game will allow players to assume one of two distinct game player roles:
defender or attacker.  The player assumes one role, and the computer (or eventually another
player) will assume the other role.  As the defender, the player will construct computer networks
having components (e.g., workstations, servers, etc.) that contain assets of differing values.  The
player will make security-relevant decisions about the network components and their intercon-
nections.  The player will also make decisions that affect the behavior of a set of virtual “user”
characters that perform other roles within the enterprise and must efficiently perform work for
the player to succeed at the game.   Hostile game characters include vandals, insiders (e.g., dis-
gruntled users), incompetent users and professional attackers willing to make significant invest-
ments to compromise high-value assets.  Attackers will employ technical exploits as well as so-
cial engineering.   As an attacker, the player will assess the vulnerabilities of specific computer
networks within the context of specific physical conditions, and then plan and execute attacks.
For example, a player might exploit a software flaw to install a “trap door” that allows continued
access the system even after the flaw is “patched”.
Such A Game Exists: It is the Internet
A flippant response to this description of a computer security simulation game is to observe that
the game already exists in the form of the Internet.  One need only hook a network to the Internet
and many parts of the “defender” role are suddenly thrust upon you.  Vandals appear out of thin
air, well prepared to provide you with a few lessons in computer security.  Similarly, the Internet
offers ample opportunities to those who would prefer to play the role of the attacker.  Besides the
obvious legal and moral deterrents to treating other peoples’ systems as a part of some large
computer game, the “Internet as a game” approach to training and education has other limita-
tions.  The greatest limitation concerns the matter of motive, which very much drives the means
by which an attacker will attempt to compromise assets, and correspondingly the types of pro-
tections that are effective.  A currently popular exercise in the computer security field is the
creation of honey pots, which are computer networks placed on the Internet for the purpose of
observing the techniques employed by attackers.  The theory is that by deploying various protec-
tion mechanisms as part of these honey pots, you can learn which defenses are effective. How-
ever, unless information assets with an equivalent value of a million dollars are managed on the
honey pot, it is unlikely that the full range of available lessons in computer security will be expe-
rienced.   Honey pots attract the adventurous and vandals.  They are less likely to attract well-
motivated professionals who have conducted background research sufficient to indicate the value
of information assets located within the honey pot.  Thus these devices fail to illustrate attacks
against high-value assets and do not illustrate to defenders the consequences of major losses.
A simulation game allows the player to experience the effects of security decisions (e.g., watch
as the player-created virtual enterprise is looted because its “users” select trivial passwords)
without taking the risks necessary to experience real loss, and without violating laws or estab-
lished norms of behavior. A game can be configured to allow players to experience a wide vari-
ety of scenarios, and can be tuned by educators to complement lectures and illustrate specific
points and concepts. An important question to be answered is whether the significant investment
in a game will result in a high payoff in education, training, and awareness regarding information
assurance concepts.
Can A Computer Security Game Be Fun and Educate?
Research shows the value of play in learning environments for children and adults (Reiber,
1996).  However, when confronted with the idea of a computer game based on computer security
concepts, the typical response from computer security professions suggested that such a thing
would not be interesting.  How can you make a fun game out of passwords, encryption and “ac-
cess control lists”?  On the other hand, computer game developers reacted quite differently.
They observed that if a game premised on the administration of a virtual amusement park (Ham,
2000) can become a best seller, then a virtual world of corporate spies, obnoxious vandals, trap
doors and Trojan horses could well be compelling to game players.  The game developers sug-
gested that the security game take the form of a resource management game in which the player
starts the game with some set of resources including a finite budget.  In such a game, the player
constructs a network to support an ever-growing enterprise, reaping the benefits of productive
users, expending resources to make the users happy while balancing benefits of protecting their
assets against the risks of losing resources (e.g., time and money) to vandals and professional
attackers.
Games are attractive because they challenge players, require the use of imagination, and satisfy
the player‘s curiosity, thereby encouraging experiential and exploratory learning. The pedagogi-
cal advantages of games include their ability to motivate students and as a vehicle for conveying
a large body of information (Kirriemuir, 2002).
Elements of the Game
At the heart of the game are simulations that include several components: networks of intercon-
nected components; virtual users attempting to accomplish work; and attackers who exploit vul-
nerabilities and weaknesses of the users (e.g., through “social engineering”).  An overview illus-
tration of the relationship between the network simulation and other game elements is illustrated
in Figure 1.
 

















Figure 1: Elements of the Simulation
Constructing a Network
One goal of the game is to provide the player with some ability to engage in network construc-
tion, e.g., selecting and deploying new network components.   Optimally, the game architecture
will permit an evolution of the game implementation over time to support construction with
components having less and less abstraction.  Initially though, a fairly abstract set of components
is defined with future extensibility built into the underlying architecture. Components have secu-
rity properties and abstract functional properties.  Security properties will include vulnerabilities
such as flaws, Trojan horses and trap doors.
The player constructs the virtual network from network components; wire plants, and physical
boundaries.  Network components include workstations, servers and specialized components
(e.g., firewalls, VPN gateways, etc.).  Wire-plants include Ethernet LANs, the Internet, dedicated
communication lines, etc.  Servers include general-purpose file servers, e-mail servers and web
servers.
Network components (e.g., workstations and servers) contain assets (viz., information having
value).  The network components also include applications that access the assets on behalf of us-
ers.  Some applications include simulated human interfaces that can be invoked by the virtual
users (e.g. the player’s virtual “boss” or other “users”).  In addition to simulated applications,
network components include simulated operating system functions and mechanisms for enforc-
ing security policies.  All of these simulated software elements can potentially contain flaws or
malicious software such as trap doors and Trojan horses.
Physical boundaries are called “zones”. At any instant, each network component exists in one
and only one zone. Wire plants (e.g., Ethernet LANs) can extend to multiple zones.  Virtual users
can enter and exit zones.  Users can only physically access network components within the zone
the user currently inhabits.
Keeping Virtual Users Happy and Productive
The network is constructed for the benefit of virtual users who utilize it to store and access assets
having different values.
During the game, virtual user entities will interact with the simulation.  For example, users try to
accomplish work (e.g., access assets necessary to do a particular job).  Users entities also engage
in behavior that affects the security of the network (e.g., choose poor passwords, unwittingly
support social engineering attacks, introduce potentially malicious software into the system, etc.)
When the game player has assumed the role of defender, virtual user entities can nag, harass and
whine to the player with demands for more connectivity, more real-time data sharing and more
applications.
Game Characters: Users and Attackers
The behavior of the game’s various virtual characters is defined by their goals.  The following
list enumerates the different character roles within the game.
• Typical User -- Just wants to do the job, and not trusted to handle sensitive information.
 Dislikes hassles.  Generally does a good job and does not access information that is not
part of the basic job description.  Willing to learn new things (e.g., via training), but will
find an expedient (and potentially damaging) work-around if the "right way" is not obvi-
ous and easy.
• Trusted User  -- Generally trusted to handle sensitive information.  Overall goals give
this user a lot more tolerance for hassles and as willingness to learn what is needed.  May
need to read and modify high sensitivity data at the same time as reading low sensitivity
data (e.g., from the Internet).  Optimally, both types of data will be on the same physical
system, permitting combined real-time processing.  At a minimum, this user desires a
scheme to get copies of low sensitivity data onto the physical system that processes high
sensitivity data.  
• Angry User -- Looking for ways to harm the enterprise, but the motive is spite and the
user would avoid punishment in most situations.  Not motivated to either expend a lot of
energy to achieve damage, or to take risks that would result in getting caught and embar-
rassed or fired.
• Aggressive Incompetent User -- Not authorized to handle sensitive data, and generally
will not violate a clear policy (e.g., a mandatory access control policy).  However, this
user's eagerness will cause the user to stretch the meaning of "discretionary" policies.
 The biggest problem with this user is ignorance of the user’s own limitations.  This user
may cause damage to a lot of information that the user should not even have access to.
• Vandal -- Motivated by boredom, desire for attention and/or just plain technical curios-
ity.  Not motivated to expend significant resources, but is technically capable (e.g., could
author viruses or install software onto a machine to which access has been gained).  Some
of these characters are deliberately obnoxious and attempt to explicitly damage resources.
Others simply wish to experiment and do not view their own actions as malicious, how-
ever their mere entrance into the system costs the player resources (e.g., to perform fo-
rensics to ensure no damage was done).
• Professional Attacker -- Motive largely driven by resource values.  Often interested in
clandestine attacks that cannot be traced back to the attacker’s organization. Able and
willing to dedicate both time and funds on the attack, e.g. to send agents to go to work for
your enterprise.  Getting an agent installed as one of your "trusted users" would be a big
challenge, but getting an agent (or corrupting an existing user) as one of your typical us-
ers would be relatively easy.  The professional is also willing to send agents to go to work
for your software vendors with a goal of installing a trap door or Trojan horse into the
software you use, and thus subvert your system.
Destroying What You Have Built: Become the Attacker
As a defender, the primary goal of the player is to cause the simulation to reflect effects of
choices on network vulnerabilities and the ability of virtual users to accomplish work.   The
game allows its players to see the network from antoher perspective: the player will be able to
assume the role of an attacker; potentially attacking the very network constructed and defended
earlier in the game. The attacker role will illustrate the effectiveness of different types of attacks
against a network having various kinds of defenses.  As the attacker, the player will make deci-
sions regarding tactics (e.g., install a Trojan horse for later exploit) and will see the effectiveness
(or lack thereof) of the network defenses.
What Are the Lessons to Be Learned?
The game is intended to provide training and education to a fairly broad target audience.  Simple
lessons such as the value of non-trivial passwords and the risks of walking away from a worksta-
tion without first logging off are readily provided to any player of the game.  Some of the more
subtle aspects of computer security, such as the inability of firewalls to effectively constrain in-
formation flow, require the use of more sophisticated scenarios.  Because future computer secu-
rity professionals are an important target audience of the game, a series of scenarios have been
constructed to introduce this audience to the set of lessons enumerated below.
An Enumeration of Lessons
1) Computer systems (including networks of computers) can only be said to be “secure” with
respect to some defined “information security policy”.  Therefore if those responsible for the se-
curity of the computer system do not know the information security policy, then the computer
system, despite the presence of a variety of security features, is not likely to be secure.
2) An “information security policy” is not a technical or engineering document, and it is not an
implementation document.  Rather, an information security policy is typically a management di-
rective that identifies the sensitivities of information and the constraints placed on people who
might have access to the information (Sterne, 1990).
3) Historically, there are three kinds of information security policies:
a. Confidentiality – prevention of the unauthorized disclosure of information
b. Integrity – prevention of the unauthorized modification of information
c. Availability – prevention of the unauthorized withholding of information or resources. 
(This includes the unauthorized theft of computational resources since it fundamentally
results in the withholding of the stolen resources from those who are paying to use them.)
4) Equal to the importance of knowing the information security policies is having assurance that
the policies are in fact enforced.  Dependence on technology to enforce an information security
policy requires a defined level of assurance.  Misplaced confidence in the security of a system is
worse than having no confidence at all in its security.  For example, consider the misplaced trust
in a supposedly “secure” cryptographic system, such as Enigma, that was a serious contributor to
the loss of World War II by the Axis powers (Kahn, 1967; Winterbothum, 1974).
5) The ability to achieve a high level of assurance that a system enforces confidentiality or integ-
rity policies is different in kind from the challenges associated with availability policies. In gen-
eral, the subjective nature of availability renders it impossible to verify to a high degree of assur-
ance that a system possesses the quality of availability, particularly in the face of malicious soft-
ware
6) Enforcement of confidentiality and integrity policies can be verified to a high degree of assur-
ance. Enforcement of a subset of policies known as “non-discretionary” or “mandatory” policies
is verifiable even in the face of malicious software.  Non-discretionary policies are characterized
as having precise definitions, and are both global and persistent.
7) High degrees of assurance cannot be achieved through testing and cycles of “penetrate and
patch”.  Typical applications software and “best commercial practice” protection mechanisms
will always have exploitable flaws.  Patching the known flaws is necessary to deter opportunistic
attackers.   Auditable designs that are free of flaws are necessary to deter motivated profession-
als.
8) Discretionary security policies and application policies generally are difficult to enforce in the
face of malicious software, but they are effective for enforcing policies based on the user’s iden-
tity or the user’s role as in role based access controls (Ferraiolo, 1992).
9) System security engineering should ensure that, for access control policies, enforcement of
mandatory policies take precedence over discretionary policies, i.e., that discretionary policy en-
forcement mechanisms should be unable to override the mandatory policy, regardless of discre-
tionary permissions granted
10) Additional security requirements related to the accountability of individuals for their secu-
rity-relevant actions in the computer system are required for the correct enforcement of manda-
tory and discretionary policies. These include such things as identification and authentication;
audit; and secure administration of the system.
11) Interaction between users and protection mechanisms (e.g., authentication) requires a trusted
path that the user can reliably invoke to ensure communication with the protection mechanism
and not a malicious “spoof” of the protection mechanism.  An example of such a spoof is when a
user thinks that an e-mail message has been electronically signed, and yet malicious software
causes an altered version of the message to be signed.
12) Encryption can provide supporting functions such as communications security, however
there are limitations to the problems that can be solved by encryption. In addition, use of encryp-
tion introduces the need to manage encryption keys and reliably process the data and keys, and
this often results in subtle vulnerabilities.
13) The security policy must address the potential of “indirect access”, which is access that oc-
curs outside of the perimeter of the secure computer system.  This includes information that is
exported from (e.g., printouts, graphic images, etc.) and imported (e.g., data, programs, software
updates, etc.) to the system. For example, a system handling highly sensitive information could
routinely release certain images (e.g., satellite photographs) for consumption by non-sensitive
systems.  Malicious software on the sensitive system could encode highly sensitive information
into the image without visibly altering the image (Kurak, 1992).  In response, the security policy
may require assurance that released images are bit-for-bit identical to the original image acquired
by the sensitive system.
Malicious Software
The lessons enumerated above include distinctions between mechanisms that are effective in the
face of malicious software, and those that are not effective.  A significant value of the game is its
ability to illustrate the power and risks of malicious software.
Computers do as they are told. This is achieved through the execution of "programs" consisting
of logical instructions. The author of the program tells the computer what to do. Attackers can
author programs that execute as "malicious software". Two general forms of malicious software
are Trojan horses and trap doors. A Trojan horse is typically included as part of what appears to
be a "friendly" application program. Examples include viruses, worms, and logic bombs. A Tro-
jan horse is often designed to provide the attacker with unauthorized access to information using
the user’s own authorizations while providing an apparently useful function. A software trap
door is typically included in programs that otherwise provide some form of access control (e.g.,
the underlying mechanism that determines if a given user is authorized to access specific data).
By design, trap doors are often triggered by unique data (e.g., an obscure character string), re-
sulting in unmediated access by the attacker to the system resources. Trojan horses and trap
doors can be designed to be practically undetectable. Most computer systems have little or no
protection against a well-motivated attacker's use of malicious software thwart security policy
enforcement. Most of the "trusted" or "secure" versions of mainstream vendor operating systems
are not designed to counter this type of threat. Even when these vendors have the security of their
products evaluated, they do so at low levels of assurance -- well below that needed to counter
malicious software. The risks associated with malicious software should be considered when se-
lecting the minimum assurance that a given security policy is correctly enforced.
The value of the assets protected in a player’s enterprise will increase as successful play pro-
ceeds. In parallel, the threat of attack by professional adversaries using carefully constructed,
clandestine malicious software increases. The player must make choices with respect to network
topology and security mechanisms (and their assurance) that will be effective in preventing de-
feat by malicious software.
Game Play Considerations
The player will have to navigate within
environment shaped by two very differ-
ent, yet valid worldviews:
1. While there is no such thing as
“perfect security”, computer
systems can usually be protected
by a combination of firewalls,
anti-virus, intrusion detection,
hardening, and monitoring.
2. Any system whose security de-
pends on a combination of fire-
walls, anti-virus, intrusion detec-
tion, hardening and monitoring
should not be used to protect
critical resources when an adver-
sary has a strong motive to com-
promise the resources.
Game Strategies
The first (and recurring) lesson the
player must learn is that security policy
must be understood: what resources are
being protected, and from whom are
they being protected?  Once the player understands the value (sensitivity) of the resources (in-
formation), the player makes choices that affect the protection of the information in accordance
with the security policy.
Figure 2: Physically Isolated Networks
The single most important set of decisions the player makes involves the prevention of direct or
indirect access to highly sensitive information by those who are not authorized to access such
information. The task of the player is to construct the network so that the work factor required to
attack it via technical mechanisms will exceed that possible through other avenues, e.g. social
engineering or traditional espionage. Whenever presented with a valuable target and an opportu-
nity, professional attackers (e.g., spies, industrial espionage agents, etc.) will employ tools such
as malicious software to compromise the sensitive information.  Separating highly sensitive in-
formation onto a physically isolated network  (i.e., the "Sensitive Data Network" illustrated in
Figure 2) is one solution that avoids massive losses, however it leads to operational inefficiencies
and virtual user complaints due to an inability to share information across sensitivities in real
time.   An alternate solution that prevents massive loss while permitting controlled sharing in-
volves the use of components that enforce a mandatory access control policy with a high degree
of assurance.  The challenge with this alternative is a considerable lack of availability of compli-
ant products.  A variety of other alternatives are available to the player -- each advertised as ena-
bling controlled sharing of data in real-time while protecting highly sensitive information -- but
each of these alternatives results in massive loss at the hands of suitably motivated professional
attackers.  Within the general scope of protecting highly sensitive information, the player can
make a number of supporting policy choices related to cryptography, user authentication, physi-
cal controls and audit.  Proper choices   must be made in these areas in order to coherently pro-
tect the highly sensitive information, however no combination of choices regarding these sup-
porting policies can   counter wrong choices on basic access controls (e.g., the use of a low as-
surance   product to enforce a mandatory access control policy for the protection of highly sensi-
tive data).
Quantitatively, most of the choices made by the player have little to do with protecting highly
sensitive information from people who should be constrained from accessing such information.
Operational goals (e.g., an employee's ability to efficiently do work) drastically limit the scope of
information that can be properly handled as if it were highly sensitive. Information whose sensi-
tivity is moderate to low is placed on a "Non-sensitive Data Network” that provides access to
great numbers of people using a range application programs. This is a natural result of people
wanting to share information with the least possible interference. As a result, a good deal of in-
formation that is somewhat sensitive is placed on a network whose security depends on firewalls,
intrusion detection, anti-virus and other fundamentally weaker techniques.  Nevertheless, this is a
viable strategy because: 1) the value of the information does not strongly motivate professional
attackers; 2) compromise of the information does not result in massive loss to the enterprise; and
3) it supports easy sharing and access to information for those people who need it to do their
jobs. Of course, this only succeeds if the truly highly sensitive information is kept on a physi-
cally separate Sensitive Data Network (that might be interconnected to the Non-sensitive Data
Network via components having high assurance mandatory access controls). The low-to-
moderately sensitive information does need protection, because all potential users are not
authorized to access all of the data on these networks. Successfully protecting this information
requires the player to make a lot of choices, particularly when the information is potentially ac-
cessible to large numbers of users (e.g., via direct or indirect connections to the Internet). Al-
though, none of these choices will significantly reduce the professional attacker's ability to com-
promise this information, poor choices result in loss due to vandalism, disgruntled employees,
incompetence and professionals willing to glean moderately valuable information from weakly
protected systems. Due to the nature of the policies and mechanisms, there are really no truly
"correct" choices, so the incidence of vandalism and such is never completely eliminated.
Some of the choices the player makes towards protecting information on the Non-sensitive Data
Network involve security concepts such as discretionary access controls, user authentication,
audit and communications security concepts including cryptography. Other player decisions and
actions may relate to ensuring that application programs are protected from unexpected input
data, resulting in malicious or otherwise unintended behavior by the application itself.
At least as important as (if not more important than) the technical solutions chosen by the player
are the choices related to communicating with virtual users. Understanding how the system users
access information, training users, coordinating changes and being aware of what features users
introduce into the system are critical to keeping virtual users happy, productive and relatively
free of disaster.  In addition, users must apply the procedures necessary to complement the tech-
nical security mechanisms, and this requires both user awareness and training.
Once the basics of the game are mastered, game-play converges on distinctions between "highly
sensitive" information and "moderately sensitive" information. This is where the most costly
losses can occur. Moving moderate-to-highly sensitive information to the Sensitive Data Net-
work results in less information compromised by professional attackers. However, if there are
limited means of sharing data in real-time across the networks, user productivity suffers. On the
other hand, leaving borderline highly sensitive information on the Non-sensitive Data Network
and improving its protections beyond some basic level will consume considerable resources (the
player's budget) and only achieve modest gains in real security. A significant lesson in this part
of the game is that attempts to create a "protected intranet" for "moderately sensitive" informa-
tion through the use of firewalls will fail to protect the information from professional attackers
who employ malicious software. On the other hand, actually creating a third, "Semi-Sensitive
Data Network" can succeed if the interconnections with other networks adhere to the security
policy and are enforced with a high degree of assurance. But again, such choices can adversely
effect the ability to share data in real-time.
Protecting data within the Sensitive Data Network from people who are authorized to access the
Sensitive data network, but not necessarily all of the information contained therein, is a different
facet of the game. Here, authentication, audit and discretionary access control mechanisms are
used to enforce a discretionary access control policy.  Also, there are potentially well-motivated
malicious insiders who try to amass a large body of the highly sensitive information with seri-
ously hostile intent (e.g., to sell to competitors).  Most protection mechanisms deployed to thwart
this activity are defeated if the motive is strong enough. Here the only successful solution may be
the recognition of an even more granular mandatory policy, which will require additional en-
forcement mechanisms in the form of additional separate networks and/or components providing
high assurance mandatory access controls.
The most substantial variation on the game is the introduction of mandatory data integrity poli-
cies. Initially in the game, the meaning of "highly sensitive" relates to the confidentiality of the
information, i.e., the information is valuable because it is a secret such as a proprietary manu-
facturing process. Within a single network (e.g., the Non-sensitive Data Network) integrity is-
sues arise in the context of a discretionary policy (e.g., someone mistakenly, or deliberately, al-
ters someone else's data). Enforcing a mandatory integrity policy introduces new challenges.
While it remains the case that much can be achieved by separating the highly sensitive informa-
tion onto a distinct Sensitive Data Network, the set of people with potential access to the infor-
mation now grows to include each author of software and data resident on that network.
Introducing Integrity Policies
Protecting secrets within a computer system is hard when faced with malicious software. Pro-
tecting the integrity of critical systems and data is arguably very much harder. To maintain con-
fidentiality, the system can be physically isolated with only authorized people permitted physi-
cally access to it, as is done in “system high” or “dedicated mode” processing.   On such a physi-
cally isolated system, software of dubious origins can be installed and executed without fear that
the system will pass secrets to unauthorized users because their are none.  But, if the integrity of
data is of concern, then one must think about who wrote the software you are running, and who
provided all of the data that enters your system.   The player can ensure that only authorized
people physically access high integrity systems, but, if so designed, the application and operating
system software of unknown origin can modify data independent of the desires of the authorized
users. Who wrote the software for the laptop? Who wrote the software in critical military sys-
tems? Techniques that counter subversion of secrecy policies (e.g., physically separate networks)
are not always sufficient for countering the subversion of integrity policies.
For a relatively modest investment, an enemy can design, implement and field software to share
in the control of a variety of different critical systems ranging from aircraft carriers to water
treatment plants to electrical power distribution facilities.  The problem is not one of  “software
safety” or “software reliability”.  A serious threat is deliberate design choices made by adversar-
ies to alter the behavior of the system (Anderson, 2002). Briefly consider the fundamentals of
method, opportunity and motive:
• Means:  writing compact, obscure, data-driven software that performs complex opera-
tions is a fairly common skill.
• Opportunity:  commercial off-the-shelf software.  Go to work for a vendor and implement
your own features. A recent version of the Excel spreadsheet program contains a flight
simulator game triggered by an obscure keystroke sequence. No amount of testing per-
formed by the vendor or the buyer could detect a small, well crafted, and obfuscated arti-
fice.
• Motive:  we hardly need reminding that there are relatively sophisticated groups willing
to invest a lot to cause massive damage.
It may be that critical systems are controlled by carefully designed software built by reliable pro-
grammers.  But in many cases this high integrity software shares the network with software that
literally could have come from anywhere. The most egregious examples are high integrity criti-
cal programs that run on top of bloated commercial operating systems having no end of security
flaws and tens of thousands of different authors employed by scores of different enterprises.
Who wrote these operating systems? The game will include scenarios that illustrate the risks and
countermeasures to the subversion threat to integrity policies.  These risks are mitigated by use
of high-assurance integrity enforcement mechanisms together with the use of high integrity ap-
plications for the input and modification of high integrity data (Irvine, 2002).
Assessing the Player’s Success
During the game, the player’s success is reflected in terms of how well the enterprise is doing
(e.g., using a metric of dollars.)  The player can query the “thoughts” of individual virtual users
to view the user’s level of happiness and current complaints and desires, such as: “I sure would
like more convenient Internet access.”  After game play has completed, the player experiences a
debriefing in which the player choices are critiqued by the system.  To facilitate education and
training, scenarios can be narrowly constructed to focus on specific topics.  Lessons that should
be learned in earlier scenarios can be incorporated into subsequent scenarios to gauge the
player’s ability to apply lessons learned to new situations.
Conclusion
CISR has concluded that an entertaining game for effectively teaching fundamentals of computer
security can be built and is currently constructing such a game. This paper describes the abstract
components of the resource management simulation. The game can be played in either of two
modes: attack and defend. In each, the player makes choices with respect to security mechanisms
and must interact with a set of virtual entities. When played in defensive mode, success is de-
fined as profitable running of an Internet-connected enterprise, while offensive mode allows the
player to understand the adverse impact of malicious activity.
We have provided a high level description of the network topologies to be presented by the game
and have discussed important teaching objectives associated with the game. The game has been
designed to be extensible. Its initial version will be restricted to single players. A subsequent ver-
sion of the game permitting multiple players and advanced use of mobile computing resources is
planned. Our intent is to construct the game such that it can be tailored to particular teaching ob-
jectives and will present interfaces that can be used to add supplementary educational materials
as well as student assessment tools. Whether the significant investment in a game has resulted in
a high payoff in education, training, and awareness regarding information assurance concepts
will be the subject of additional research following its release.
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